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  Invasive species change ecosystems and the economic services such ecosystems provide. 
Optimal policy will minimize the expected damages and costs of prevention and control. We 
seek to explain policy outcomes as a function of biological and economic factors, using the 
case of Hawaii to illustrate. First, we consider an existing invader, Miconia calvescens, a plant 
with the potential to reduce biodiversity, soil cover, and water availability. We then examine 
an imminent threat, the potential arrival of the Brown treesnake (Boiga irregularis). The arri-
val of the snake in Guam has led to native bird extirpations, power outages, and health costs. 
 




Invasive species change ecosystems and the eco-
nomic services that ecosystems provide. Policy 
decisions must weigh anticipated costs and bene-
fits before a new species becomes introduced, 
actual costs and benefits of any mitigating actions 
once a species has become established, antici-
pated costs and benefits of accommodating the 
change, and the comparative advantages of pre-
venting and/or controlling one set of ecosystem 
changes over another. Optimal policy regarding 
invasive species will minimize the expected dam-
ages and costs of control within an ecosystem. 
  The existing literature on the economics of 
invasive species has taken several complementary 
approaches to evaluating policy options, but to 
date these efforts remain fragmented across the 
timeline of an invasion or set of invasions. Due in 
part to the complexity of modeling and the speci-
ficity of biological factors involved in creating 
ecosystem changes, most case studies focus on a 
single invading species (Eiswerth and Johnson 
2002, Knowler 2005, Knowler and Barbier 2000, 
Settle and Shogren 2002, Kaiser and Roumasset 
2002) or on damages at a particular location and 
time (Kasulo 2000, Turpie and Heydenrych 2000). 
Here we examine the case of ecologically uncon-
nected invaders in Hawaii across time, investigat-
ing both existing invasions and potential invaders, 
since monies available for combating damages 
from both types of invasions are often expected to 
come from the same resource pools. 
  Theoretical treatment of invasions introduces 
conditions for eradication (Olson and Roy 2002), 
policy options under uncertainty (Horan et al. 
2002, Eiswerth and van Kooten 2002, Olson and 
Roy 2002), and integrated prevention and control 
(Pitafi and Roumasset 2005). Tying invasions to 
trade (Costello and McAusland 2003), ecological-
economic feedback loops (Settle, Crocker, and 
Shogren 2002), and capital growth (Barbier and 
Shogren 2004), authors highlight the connections 
between human decision making and invasive 
species impacts. 
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  The case of Hawaii is used to illustrate dy-
namic policy options for invasive species. Ha-
waii’s ecosystems provide direct and indirect eco-
system services, with high expected value gener-
ated from the preservation of existing ecosystem 
conditions stemming from unique biodiversity 
assets. Invasive species concerns extend beyond 
biodiversity to include human health concerns 
and infrastructure for both power and water sup-
ply. Each invasion presents its own set of poten-
tial damages; we seek to aid policy determina-
tions through methodology that assesses the pre-
sent value of expected damages and costs given 
the likelihood of a successful invasion and the 
optimal control or accommodation of its associ-
ated expected damages. We examine the theoreti-
cal findings with data from two cases affecting 
Hawaii: the weedy shrub Miconia (Miconia calves-
cens), an existing invader, and the Brown tree-
snake (Boiga irregularis), a highly likely invader. 
  In most if not all cases, the most costly antici-
pated changes are irreversible. Due to the need to 
anticipate irreversible change, policy decisions 
may vary with the status of ecosystem health, i.e., 
the levels of invasion and the imminence of the 
threat. In this work, we seek to explain how biol-
ogy and economics work together to determine 
policy outcomes, and introduce the possibility of 
integrating optimal policy across and among ex-
isting and potential invasive species. To improve 
results and avoid costly mistakes ranging from 
denying beneficial introductions to spending 
money on ecologically impossible control or 
eradication efforts, these policies must be seen as 
a continuous effort to manage ecosystems rather 






Hawaiian Ecosystems in Perspective 
 
Hawaiian ecosystems provide excellent grounds 
for studying the economic consequences of eco-
logical change due to invasive species for several 
reasons. These ecosystems developed in relative 
isolation, and before human-aided transport, spe-
cies had to traverse approximately 3,000 miles of 
ocean desert in any direction before reaching the 
islands and becoming established. Human ma-
nipulations, including purposeful and accidental 
introductions, which began only with the arrival 
of Polynesians around the fourth century AD, are 
fairly well identified and understood. The limited 
geographical scale and incomplete biota (e.g., the 
only pre-contact mammal present in Hawaii was a 
bat, now extinct) render ecological changes both 
visible and potentially severe. Under such iso-
lated conditions, adaptive radiation has generated 
unique biodiversity in the flora and fauna that is 
particularly fragile and susceptible to biological 
invasion. 
  The islands also display for researchers the im-
portance of integrated ecosystem health. The in-
troduction of cattle by Captain Vancouver in 1794 
created such noticeable change that, within half a 
century, denuded hillsides caused concerns about 
dwindling water supplies. By the beginning of the 
twentieth century, large tracts of land, covering 
most of the mountainous areas, were placed into 
conservation districts with cattle removed in order 
to protect vital fresh water that was key not only 
to human survival but also to the economic pros-
pects for agriculture, particularly sugar cane. 
  Hawaii’s development as a tourist destination 
has been aided by its natural capital as well. 
While its unique plants and birds provide many 
interesting viewing opportunities, missing eco-
logical niches, especially insects, diseases, and 
snakes, have increased tourism values as well as 
human health values for residents and tourists 
alike. The $10 billion tourist industry dominates 
the state’s $44 billion (GSP) economy (DBEDT 
2003) and threats to the industry can inflict sig-




One significant threat comes in the form of the 
woody shrub, Miconia calvescens.  Miconia,  a 
member of the Melastomataceae family from 
Central America, was purposefully introduced to 
Hawaii. Planted in a handful of backyards and 
arboretums four decades ago, it has been spread-
ing with increasing rapidity on the islands of 
Maui and Hawaii. It is also present on Kauai and 
Oahu, though it has not claimed significant acre-
age in either location. 
  A model of its potential expansion and dam-
ages is available through comparison with Tahiti, 
where dense, monotypic stands of the tree now Burnett et al.  Prevention, Eradication, and Containment of Invasive Species: Illustrations from Hawaii   65 
 
 
cover 65 percent or more of the main island of 
Tahiti after a single specimen was introduced to 
the Papeari Botanical Garden in 1937 (Medeiros 
et al. 1997). Miconia has earned itself descriptors 
like the “green cancer” of Tahiti and the “purple 
plague” of Hawaii. Vast tracts of Miconia have 
wiped out native forest and reduced forest cover, 
increasing the potential for soil erosion, land-
slides, and damages to nearshore resources. The 
explosive growth and potential damages were not 
appreciated in Tahiti until the 1980s, however. By 
that time, Miconia was already established in 
Hawaii. 
  The damages in Tahiti and the potential threats 
to Hawaiian biodiversity and watersheds have 
rendered Miconia a priority weed in Hawaii. Since 
the early 1990s, millions of dollars have been 
spent in the battle against its spread, though 
success at spatial containment on Hawaii and 
Maui and eradication on Oahu and Kauai remains 
elusive. We explore quantitatively the policy op-
tions and their economic consequences for the 
continued treatment of the invasion in the mod-
eling and discussion sections below. 
 
Brown Treesnake (Boiga irregularis) 
 
Hawaii faces several other threats from invasive 
species, which all must be considered simultane-
ously for optimal prevention and control efforts to 
minimize expected damages to the state’s eco-
logical assets and economy. Perhaps the most 
dramatic pretender to Hawaii’s list of top pests is 
the Brown treesnake (Boiga irregularis). This 
native of Australia and New Guinea, upon estab-
lishment in Hawaii, would introduce snakes
1 to 
the islands and create a list of damages that in-
clude direct economic impacts as well as wide-
spread ecological disaster. 
  We know the potential of the damages because 
the snake was introduced to the previously snake-
free island of Guam in the 1950s and has since 
reached high-density populations of 12,000 
snakes per square mile, sending thousands to the 
hospital with venomous bites over the last 10 
years, causing the extirpation of 10 of 13 bird 
                                                                                    
1 With the exception of Ramphotyphlops braminus, a harmless blind 
snake that may have arrived as a stowaway in plant material from the 
Philippines around 1930 (http://indaba.iucn.org/archives/aliens-1/2004 
-09/00006446.htm, accessed March 2006). 
species, generating power outages with increasing 
frequency (a snake-generated outage averaged 1.5 
hours every other day in 2003, up from one every 
3–4 days in 1997), and reducing poultry produc-
tivity. [See U.S. Geological Survey (2005) for a 
recent overview of damages. Power and medical 
data courtesy of Shwiff (2005).] 
  The snake is an imminent threat to Hawaii: 
eight interceptions of identifiable Brown tree-
snakes have occurred in the past two decades [see 
Rodda et al. (1999) for details]. Trade between 
Guam and Hawaii is extensive, and Hawaii now 
pays to support Guam’s efforts to prevent the 
Brown treesnake from escaping the island. We 
use the considerable information from Guam’s 
infestation and expenditures on prevention to 
model the optimally integrated prevention and 





Optimal Control of Existing Invader 
 
Optimal control of an existing invader is related 
to the size of the initial population relative to the 
steady state population. If the population is cur-
rently at its steady state population, optimal con-
trol requires maintenance of the population, thus 
generating a stream of economic costs and dam-
ages indefinitely. If the population is currently 
above its steady state level, we expend control 
costs to reduce the population to its steady state 
and then maintain that population. If the popula-
tion lies below the steady state population, we 
accumulate damages as the population grows un-
til, at the steady state population, we initiate main-
tenance as just described. 
  Optimal control of an existing invader is simi-
lar to harvesting a beneficial species [see, e.g., 
Clark (1990)], except that the harvest yields no 
benefits, and the stock of the resource generates 
damages. Three steady states are plausible a pri-
ori: eradication, accommodation without control, 
and maintenance of a constant population with a 
constant control effort. Each steady state can be 
associated with an optimal approach path, as dis-
cussed below. The globally optimal approach path 
is the one with the minimum present value of har-
vesting costs and damages. 66    April 2006  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
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where c() is the cost of removals and D() are the 
damages from a population of n originating from 
an initial population n0. 
  Our solution algorithm searches for a minimum 
over the range of candidate steady state popula-
tions, N, where 0 ≤N ≤Nmax, and N ∈{1,2,3…}. 
This will generate an automatic comparison of 
corner solutions and the internal steady state solu-
tion. Depending on whether our steady state N is 
greater than, equal to, or less than n0, we require 
two procedures for determining the present value, 
V, of reaching and maintaining N. Therefore V 
will be dependent on the initial population, n0, 
and is denoted as V(n0,N). The minimum present 
value costs of population reduction and expansion 
are described below. 
 
  Population reduction. If the candidate popula-
tion, N, is less than n0, the optimal approach path 
involves instantaneous adjustment to the target 
population. Intuitively, spreading out adjustment 
over several years will increase removal costs 
(since the pest keeps multiplying) and add to the 
damage stream during the intervening years of 
adjustment. By assumption, there are no gains of 
spreading out the removal because the cost of 
removal is dependent only on the pest population, 
not the rate of removal.
2 The cost of that popula-
tion reduction, x=N–n 0, will be 
 
                                                                                    
2 Inasmuch as removal requires some fixed investments, there are 
likely to be economies of scale in the range of few removals and dis-
economies of scale above some high rate of removals. Knowing the 
exact parameters of this U-shaped average cost function is beyond the 
scope of the current study, however. Accordingly, we approximate the 
cost function using the conventional assumption that the unit removal 









In addition, there will be the cost of maintaining 
population at N by cutting x=g(N) every year 
forever, and the cost of damages incurred by re-
maining at that population level forever. There-
fore, we define the present value of the costs and 
damages of reducing the invasive stock from n0 to 
N, and remaining at that level in perpetuity as 
(3)   00
0
() () ()
(, ) ( )
N cNgN DN
Vn N n cnd n
rr n
≤= + + ∫ . 
  Population expansion. The optimal approach to 
stationary  N’s above n0 involves allowing the 
population to grow at its natural rate until the tar-
get population is reached. The damages accrued 








−τ τ ∫ , 
where T is the time period associated with arrival 
at the target population (determined by its natural 
rate of growth). We thus define the present value 
of the costs and damages from allowing the stock 
to grow from  0 n  to N, and remaining at that level 

























  The procedures described above result in one V 
for each of the candidate stationary populations 
investigated. The next step in the algorithm is sim-
ply to search across the N’s and find the value of 
N that minimizes V(n0,N), i.e., 
 
   0 Min   ( , )
N Vn N, 
                                                                                    
3 Note that n is used to delineate a changing population whereas N is 
used to delineate a steady state population. Thus, the cost of removals 
changes as the population moves from the initial population to a steady 
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  The optimal population that results from the 
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  If the optimal population requires eradication 
(N
*=0), or results in a population where new 
arrivals from outside the area will have noticeable 
impacts on growth, then prevention efforts must 
be considered. 
 
Optimal Prevention of Potential Invader 
 
The existing renewable resource literature does 
not allow for the possibility that the resource to 
be harvested optimally may not yet be present in 
the system. The optimal control analysis of a po-
tential invader follows directly from that of the 
existing invader above, but with the additional 
concern that the invading population is not yet 
viable. As we include within the definition of 
“potential invader” the case where small numbers 
of species in a new area have not yet formed a 
viable population, we consolidate the probabili-
ties of arrival and establishment into one concern: 
if a population exists which is large enough so 
that the impact of new arrivals on growth is neg-
ligible, the problem is the same as that of an ex-
isting invader. If not, we must consider continu-
ing prevention as defined by efforts taken to keep 
the population below a critical population level 
through eradication. 
  Ideally, we would like to simultaneously solve 
for optimal prevention and control with a prob-
abilistic arrival function. Unfortunately, this would 
involve an extremely complicated decision tree, 
with branches for arrival and non-arrival at each 
point in time that extend infinitely into the future. 
Moreover, we cannot solve for prevention and 
control today independently of prevention and 
control in future periods. We simplify this prob-
lem by assuming that there is some population, 
N , beyond which prevention expenditures are 
negligibly effective, relative to pest removal.
4 
Prevention is not necessary if N
* ≥  N , since a 
population of N  specimens is considered viable 
in that additional arrivals do not significantly im-
pact current levels of reproduction. If N
* <  N , 
however, we have the case where new entries will 
increase the population growth sufficiently and 
the first-best control solution may not be the first-
best integrated prevention and control solution. To 
determine this, we must compare whether it is 
preferable to remain at a steady state population, 
N , or whether it is better to maintain N
* <  N  
and optimally invest in prevention. 
  In order to maintain population at N
* <  N , the 
resource manager optimally invests in prevention 
of new entrants as well as control of existing ones. 
Inasmuch as such investment reduces the prob-
ability of a new pest arrival to a lower probability 
and therefore only delays the ultimate arrival, 
maintaining  N
*  requires continuous removal of 
snakes that evade initial prevention in addition to 
prevention expenditures.
5 As shown in Pitafi and 
Roumasset (2005), the expected present value of 
this prevention and removal sums the prevention 
expenditures and expected value of introduction 
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4 The stark assumption of no prevention beyond a low population can 
be replaced by a function representing the gradually decreasing impor-
tance of new introductions as the stock grows larger. We leave this 
possibility for future work. 
5 For distinction, consider initial prevention expenditures those that 
intercept a species before it has left a confined port of entry. 68    April 2006  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
where p(y) is the probability of successful intro-
duction with prevention expenditures y, and E is 
the cost of removing additional entrants, the inci-
dence of which is decreasing in y.
6  E can be 
calculated as V(e0,N), where e0 is the number of 
entrants that escape detection given prevention 
expenditures y. Note that eradication and single 
entry removal costs may be infinite, reflecting the 
imperfection of detection. 
 Minimizing  Z with respect to prevention expen-
ditures results in the following condition for op-













  Denote the minimized value of Z by Z
*(N). This 
is the cost of prevention and control when the 
steady state stock is less than  N . Our optimal 
population (N
*) and level of prevention expendi-
tures (y
*) represent a choice between combined 
prevention and control (y
* > 0, x > 0, N
* <  N ) or 
control alone (y
* = 0, x > 0, N
* ≥  N ).
7 We select 
the total cost minimizing population from the fol-
lowing comparisons: (i) if the population that mini-
mizes V(n0,N) is greater than or equal to  N , then 
N
* is that population, and V is minimized accord-
ing to equation (5) as in the case of an existing 
invader. Additional arrivals do not add meaning-
fully to the minimization of total costs and dam-
ages. However, if (ii) the population minimizing 
V(n0,N) is less than  N , we must evaluate whether 
the additional costs of the prevention/entrant-re-
moval cycle that will be incurred after reaching 
any population level below  N  are greater or less 
than maintaining a controlled steady state popula-
tion greater than or equal to  N , where additional 
prevention would not reduce impacts and y
* = 0. 
  The optimal prevention expenditure from equa-
tion (7) is substituted into equation (6) to obtain 
the minimized value Z
*(N) for each population 
level below N ; in this way we know the mini-
mized prevention costs for any population for 
                                                                                    
6 We use discrete time here for clarity of exposition.  
7 Prevention alone will be insufficient in this model because the 
probability of arrival accumulates to one over time. We make this as-
sumption to reflect the imperfection of prevention. 
which new arrivals increase impacts. One of these 
populations, N
*, will minimize the sum of Z
*(N) 
(preventing and removing new entrants) plus the 
control cost of achieving and maintaining (inde-




*). The cost of this population 
is compared to V(n0,N≥ N ) to determine whether 
the optimal policy for integrated prevention and 
control involves (i) staying at the current popula-
tion level (n0=N), (ii) reducing stock and not 
spending on prevention (n 0>N≥ N ), (iii) reduc-
ing stock and spending on prevention (N< N ), or 
(iv) allowing the stock to grow unabated until 
some maintained steady state greater than the 





We investigate empirically the cases of Miconia 
and the Brown treesnake, discussed above. For 
each case, we determine cost, damage, and growth 
function parameters with the help of scientists 
researching the species and resource managers 
actively pursuing prevention or control. Through-
out, we use a 2 percent discount rate. The remain-
ing parameters are discussed below, followed by 




Growth function. We utilize a standard logistic 
growth function, g(n)=bn[1–(n/Nmax)], to repre-
sent the spread of the invasive tree. The intrinsic 
growth rate, b, is estimated here to be 0.3, and the 
carrying capacity, Nmax, is estimated to be 100 
trees per acre covering 1 million acres, or 
100,000,000. The acreage of the carrying capacity 
is determined by the chief limiting factor for 
Miconia in Hawaii, precipitation, so the potential 
range indicates areas above the 1800 mm/yr 
rainfall line. The growth rate was determined by 
analyzing the spread of the tree on Hawaii, where 
we know the origins of the first population and its 
spread until harvesting began in the mid-1990s. 
 
  Damage (net benefit) function. We estimate 
damages from Miconia as evolving from indirect 
ecosystem services as well as non-market goods 
like biodiversity. The damages may occur as Burnett et al.  Prevention, Eradication, and Containment of Invasive Species: Illustrations from Hawaii   69 
 
 
rapid ecological changes: the plant can invade na-
tive forest (Meyer 1998), and the seed bank is 
both long-lived and plentiful (Loope 1997, Duffy 
2005). 
  Hawaii is home to a great percentage of the 
United States’ and the world’s identified endan-
gered species. Changes in forest composition may 
threaten endangered plant species, bird species, 
and invertebrate species in particular. The wet, 
higher elevations of Maui and Hawaii contain 
most of the only remaining healthy native forests 
supporting such diversity in the state, which are 
now threatened by Miconia. For example, the 
upper Kipahulu Valley on Maui is a conservation 
district reserve containing stands of Ohia 
(Metrosideros polymorphata) and Koa (Acacia 
koa) that are the primary habitat for rare native 
Hawaiian birds and insects, and Miconia has been 
discovered in the lower valley (Anon. 2001). 
  In the federal register listing materials for the 
endangered Elepaio (Chasiempis sandwichensis) 
bird on Oahu, the main justification for protection 
is based on the bird’s reliance on the current for-
est structure [see U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
(2001) for example]. Since Miconia poses a sig-
nificant threat to that structure, the plant is listed 
directly as one of the concerns for the bird’s sur-
vival. A set of studies indicates that, on average, 
each household would be willing to pay $31 (95 
percent confidence interval of $16.66–$48.92) 
per bird species per year to keep a species from 
extinction (Loomis and White 1996). This 
amounts to an annual value for Hawaii’s residents 
of $12.4 million per avian species preserved. As 
an approximation of the potential damages from 
Miconia, we estimate the full threat of loss in 
biodiversity on all islands to be equivalent to a 
loss of half the endangered bird species, or $103–
303 million per year (value per bird × 31 birds × 
0.5). Note that this is expected to be a conserva-
tive estimate in that it includes benefits only to 
the state’s residents, and that even though virtu-
ally all of the 31 species live in the same pristine 
habitat that the tree is likely to invade, we count 
at most half of the birds as threatened by the po-
tential invasion. The uncertainty associated with 
this estimate is particularly high; we create a 
range of estimates using the 95 percent confi-
dence interval to underscore a portion of this un-
certainty. 
  Additional damages to watershed functions are 
also expected from dense stands of Miconia. The 
hydrological properties of Miconia suggest that 
there may be a significant change in the water 
balance, with an increase in runoff and a potential 
reduction in groundwater recharge.
8 Groundwater 
recharge is of significant consequence for Oahu 
but less important for Maui, Hawaii, and Kauai, 
which generate less of their fresh water supply 
from groundwater. Estimates of potential ex-
pected losses from an invasion of Miconia on 
Oahu to groundwater recharge may be as high as 
$137 million per year (Kaiser and Roumasset 
2002). Increased sedimentation will incur surface 
water quality damages on any infested island; 
costs for Oahu have been estimated to be at least 
$4.84 million per year (Kaiser and Roumasset 
2000). Extrapolating from this figure to Hawaii, 
Maui, Molokai, and Kauai by susceptible land 
area as a first approximation, damages for the 
state could increase approximately tenfold, to 
$48.4 million per year. If the infestation takes 
hold only in the highly likely cases of Hawaii, 
Maui, and Oahu, then we estimate these damages 
at $33.9 million per year. 
  If all damages occurred, then the total damages 
would range from $273.9 million to $488.4 mil-
lion, with an estimated average of $377.4 million 
per year. Assuming that any one tree should be 
equally responsible for its portion of damages, 
ceteris paribus, we determine a per-tree damage 
rate of $3.77. Total expected damages for any 
given population are described by the function
9 
 
(9)  D(n) = 3.77n. 
 
  Control cost function. Control efforts began on 
Maui in 1991 and continue to expand on the four 
                                                                                    
8 The particular role of Miconia in groundwater recharge is uncertain; 
on the one hand, increased runoff suggests that there is less water 
available for recharge, but changes in evapotranspiration rates may 
counteract this loss. Surveys of forested watershed experts list Miconia 
as a very serious threat, however (see http://homepage.mac.com/ 
ondinebak for survey results on threats to watershed quality on Oahu). 
9 For simplicity, we assume a uniform distribution function where 
any tree contributes to the loss equally, given the existing population 
level, and the cumulative distribution as the probability of total losses 
for any given population, n, is just n/Nmax. The marginal damages from 
loss of biodiversity and watershed quality are thus $3.77 per tree, and 
the expected damages for any given population is $3.77 × n. 
To model a potentially more realistic situation where the damages are 
increasing at an increasing rate with population, the beta distribution 
might be preferred.  70    April 2006  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
invaded islands. While each island has its own 
strategy for controlling the invader, we simplify 
control to represent operations on the two most 
heavily invaded islands of Maui and Hawaii. 
Control in these areas begins with reconnaissance 
in helicopters to identify infestations and is fol-
lowed by either herbicide treatment from the 
helicopters themselves or by operations on the 
ground to treat or manually remove the trees. In 
any case, there are two separate functions that must 
occur—the trees must first be found, then treated. 
  We therefore define a cost function consisting 
loosely of two parts: the “search” component and 
the “treatment” component. While the unit cost of 
treating a tree with herbicide and/or cutting a tree 
may be constant across population levels, the cost 
of finding and gaining access to a tree is rapidly 
decreasing in population size (and density). That 
is, it is extremely expensive to find the last tree, 
but much less so to find one tree out of 100 mil-
lion trees. In 2003, the total number of trees con-
trolled on four islands was 72,339. Conversations 
with resource managers suggest that annual con-
trol expenditures for Miconia in 2003 were over 
$1 million, with about $1 million spent on Maui 
to remove 69,000 trees, $321,000 spent on Oahu 
to remove 1,100 trees, and uncertain budgets on 
Hawaii and Kauai to remove the remainder. The 
72,339 trees that were removed were thought to 
be less than one-quarter of the existing popula-
tion. Using this data along with budgetary and 
removal data from operations on Maui, Oahu, and 
Hawaii sporadically available from 1996–2002, 
we approximate the following total marginal cost 









   h(x) = 13.39, 
 
where s(x) represents the search cost component 
and  h(x) represents the cost of treatment (har-
vest), constant across all population levels. The 





(,) (,) () 1 3 . 3 9 cnx snx hx
n
=+ = + , 
so that the total cost of searching and treating x 
trees is 
 
(10)    
1.66
1,000,000,000







  This cost function does imply that eradication 
costs are infinite, which we accept as likely given 
both the longevity of the seed bank [now thought 
to be at least 10 years (Duffy 2005)] and the great 
difficulty of locating and accessing seedlings in 
remote areas. 
 
  Optimal control results. While the exact num-
ber is uncertain, a rough estimate of the current 
population level is 436,000. Using the above pa-
rameters and the assumption that the current stock 
of Miconia is 436,000 trees, we find that we 
should engage in population reduction and main-
tain an N
* of 31,295 trees. Regardless of the 
initial stock, we find that this internal steady state 
is optimal. Note that these trees will be the most 
expensive to locate and remove; as our cost func-
tion assumes increasing search costs as popula-
tions dwindle, our results implicitly factor in at 
least one aspect of the spatial concerns. 
  Because our initial population is greater than 
31,295 trees, it is optimal to remove trees until we 
reach this population size. We should then re-
move the growth produced by this stock level 
each and every year in order to remain at this 
population level. This internal optimum of 31,295 
trees is a consequence of very high search costs 
of finding very few remaining trees combined 
with the significant damage produced at high 
population levels. This case is illustrated in Fig-
ure 1 below. 
  While the results for Miconia suggest an inter-
nal optimum, a species with different bioeconomic 
parameters may require a corner solution of ac-
commodation or eradication. For example, if we 
replace our constant marginal damage function 
with one that is two orders of magnitude smaller 
or with a rapidly decreasing marginal damage 
function, we find that accommodation is the 
optimal policy. Accommodation is also preferred 
if the removal cost function is significantly higher. 
Furthermore, if the removal cost function in-
volves a low marginal cost at low populations and 
a high marginal cost at high populations, we find 
that eradication is optimal. Burnett et al.  Prevention, Eradication, and Containment of Invasive Species: Illustrations from Hawaii   71 
 
 








Figure 1. Present Value of Alternative 
Stationary Populations of Miconia 
(N
* = 31,295) (millions of dollars) 
 
 
  Status quo vs. optimal policy. Current Miconia 
policy in Hawaii entails spending approximately 
$1 million per year on control efforts. In 2003, 
approximately 72,000 trees were treated with this 
budget. As a final exercise for this species, we 
compare the consequences of status quo spending 
to those associated with the optimal policy pro-
gram in order to investigate the extent to which 
status quo expenditures may be misaligned with 
optimal expenditures. 
  Table 1 highlights the cost savings from switch-
ing to the optimal program for Miconia. Society 
can either continue to spend $1 million per year 
on control indefinitely, which will result in a 
status quo steady state population near carrying 
capacity, or spend $6.27 million today to reduce 
the population to 31,295 and spend only $449,245 
per year following this removal. The present value 
cost of the optimal program is $28.7 million, 
while the present value cost of the status quo 
regime is $50 million. Additionally, the optimal 
policy will reduce losses by over $12 billion com-
pared to the status quo. Therefore, compared to 
the optimal plan, spending $1 million each period 
not only costs more but also yields a much lower 
return. 
  An increase in spending to $2 million per year 
on control, which is politically tractable under 
current conditions, leads to a steady state popula-
tion of trees very close to the initial population. 
The present value cost of following this status 
quo policy is $100 million, producing present 
value damages of $90 million for a combined loss 
of $190 million, compared to the optimal program 
whose combined losses equal $36 million. 
  The large gap in damages between the $1 mil-
lion and $2 million policies is due to the fact that, 
currently, $1 million per year in expenditures is 
essentially wasted, as it only slightly slows the 
rate of natural growth, while $2 million per year 
is sufficient to reach an internal steady state at a 
level close to the current level of infestation. 
Thus, a seemingly small relative increase in cur-
rent expenditures can make a significant im-
provement in overall welfare if it is enough to 
move from a policy where growth continues to 





Growth function. Again, we utilize the logistic 
growth function to represent the potential spread 
of the snakes. In this case, b = 0.6, based on esti-
mated population densities at different time peri-
ods on Guam (Rodda et al. 1999). The maximum 
elevation range of the snake may be as high as 
1,400 m (Kraus and Cravalho 2001). We estimate 
that there are just over 777,000 hectares (3,000 
square miles) of potential snake habitat on Ha-
waii, so that, extrapolating from Guam’s maxi-
mum densities of 50 snakes per hectare (Rodda, 
Fritts, and Conry 1992), Nmax for Hawaii is esti-
mated at 38,850,000. 
 
  Damage function. Guam has a land area of ap-
proximately 53,900 hectares, with a maximum 
elevation of about 400 meters. With a population 
density of 50 snakes per hectare, we estimate a 
potential maximum population level (Nmax) for 
Guam to be 2.695 million snakes. With approxi-
mately 272 hours of power outages per year at-
tributable to snakes, we estimate that there are 
1.01 × 10
-4 power outages per snake per year. An-
nual electricity generation capacity per capita in 
Guam is virtually the same as on Hawaii, at 2kW/ 
capita. We estimate that an hour-long power out-
age on Oahu causes $1.2 million in lost pro-
ductivity and damages (Fritts and Chiszar 1997). 
Positing a linear relationship between snake popu-
lation and power outages, the expected damage 
per snake in Hawaii, in terms of power outage 
costs, is $121.11. 
  Guam has experienced a snakebite frequency 
average of 170 bites per year, at an average cost 
of $264.35 per hospital visit. Thus the expected 72    April 2006  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 












Status quo  $1 m  $1 m  $369.5 m  $12.35 b  $50 m  $12.4 b 
2 × status-quo spending  $2 m  $2 m  $1.76 m  $90 m  $100 m  $190 m 
Optimal program  $6.27 m  $449,245  $117,982  $7.4 m  $28.7 m  $36.1 m 
 
 
level of bites per snake per year is at least 6.31 × 
10
-5, with an expected cost of $0.02 per snake. 
Hawaii’s population density below 1,400 m is 
approximately half that of Guam’s. Snake-human 
interactions should occur less frequently per hec-
tare. However, Hawaii’s population is eight times 
greater than Guam’s, so we adjust the expected 
costs for Hawaii to $0.07 per snake. 
  The Brown treesnake has extirpated 77 percent 
(10 of 13 species) of Guam’s native forest bird 
population since its arrival (Vice 2005). As dis-
cussed above, contingent valuation studies have 
estimated the average value of the continued exis-
tence of an endangered bird species at $31 per 
household per year for Hawaii. There are 15 en-
dangered bird species in Hawaii whose main 
habitat is below this level. Of these, three are na-
tive to small, unpopulated islands that are unlikely 
to experience the arrival of the snake, and four 
are water birds, also users of unlikely habitat for 
the arboreal snake. If we assume a 75 percent 
chance of losing each of the remaining eight 
species, the expected value of these damages to 
403,240 households in Hawaii is $75 million. If 
each snake is equally likely to contribute to the 
extirpation, the expected damages per snake are 
$1.93. We consider these the base level for high 
damages possible from the presence of the snakes. 
If the snakes do not have the same success at ex-
tirpating bird populations, or if there is a bias in 
the contingent valuation estimates that does not 
account for the marginal benefit of saving an 
additional species as being potentially lower than 
$31 per household per year (see Loomis and White 
1996), then this estimate may be too high. We use 
the value to Hawaii residents of losing one 
species, or $12.5 million, to estimate the base for 
low damages, with an expected per snake damage 
level of $0.32. 
  Thus, expected damages from human health 
factors, power outages, and expected endangered 
species losses can be expressed as DH = 123.11 × 
nt, and DL = 121.50 × nt. The maximum annual 
damages that Hawaii faces without control efforts 
are therefore Nmax  × 123.11, which equals $4.8 
billion. We take the expectation of the high and 
low damages to get a damage function of 
 
(11)  D = 122.31 × nt. 
 
  Control cost function. We assume that control 
costs are decreasing in n and linear in x. We 








based on the current expenditures for snake con-
trol on Guam and on attempts to capture sus-
pected snakes in Hawaii. We fit our cost curve to 
match the expected costs to capture one snake out 
of the predicted current population and the first 
snake out of 39 million.  Experts are uncertain 
about how many snakes might have arrived in 
Hawaii, but suggest there may be between zero 
and 100 already here. Searches occur when a 
positive sighting has taken place. Catching a 
single snake out of roughly 15 will be at least 
$76,000, and catching one out of a population of 
one will cost just under $1,000,000. Catching a 
single snake from a population at capacity costs 
about $31 based on the cost of night traps and a 
study investigating the use of dogs in detecting 
planted snakes. 
 
  Probability of arrival (establishment). We as-
sume that prevention expenditures buy a reduc-
tion in the probability that a snake will arrive and 
become established. The higher the probability of 
arrival, the easier it will be to capture any one 
entrant. Conversations with Boiga irregularis 
scientists and resource managers have led us to Burnett et al.  Prevention, Eradication, and Containment of Invasive Species: Illustrations from Hawaii   73 
 
 
understand the following regarding the probabil-
ity of arrival given different levels of funding. 
Under current prevention expenditures of $2.6 
million, Hawaii faces an approximate 90 percent 
probability that a single snake will arrive over a 
ten-year time horizon. If expenditures were in-
creased to $4.7 million, the probability of a single 
arrival decreases twofold, to about 45 percent. 
Finally, if we increase preventative spending to 
$9 million per year, the probability of an arrival 
decreases another twofold, to about 20 percent. 
Based on these data, we choose the Weibull dis-
tribution to describe the probability of a single 
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Figure 2 illustrates this function. 
 


























Figure 2. Probability of Brown Treesnake 
Arrival as a Function of Prevention Spending 
 
 
  Optimal prevention and control results. If pre-
vention were costless, the optimal strategy would 
be immediate eradication. Using the parameteri-
zation described above and the assumption that 
there are seven snakes currently in Hawaii,
10 this 
would result in V
0 = V
* = $2.09  million.  With 
costly prevention, however, eradication requires 
                                                                                    
10 As discussed earlier, the exact population of Brown treesnakes in 
Hawaii is not known, although experts suggest that the number may be 
between zero and 100. We use a conservative guess of seven for 
exposition.  
repeated cycles of eradication followed by pre-
vention. In order to maintain a zero population of 
snakes, we would need to spend $1 million to 
eradicate any potential entrant. Given this cost, 
our minimized Z
0 is $49.8 million. When this 
cost is added to the present value of costs and 
damages of achieving the zero population level 
(V
0), total losses
11 equal $51.9 million. This turns 
out to be suboptimal. 
  As discussed earlier, we assume that optimal 
prevention expenditures are negligible once the 
pest reaches the threshold population  N . For 
illustrative purposes, we set  N  equal to three. 
The total losses associated with maintaining one 
snake are $27.4 million; the total losses of a two-
snake population are $26.4 million. With three 
snakes, we no longer have to add the Z
* compo-
nent of repeated entrant removals and prevention; 
optimal prevention is zero. Therefore, the total 
cost
12 associated with maintaining a population of 
three snakes is $17.8 million. Figure 3 illustrates 
the four components of total losses: the perpetual 
prevention/entrant removal expenditures (if the 
candidate N is less than three), perpetual popula-
tion maintenance costs, perpetual damages, and 
the instantaneous removal cost (if the candidate N 
is less than seven). The thick line sums these 
components and illustrates the conclusion that the 
optimal population is three. Inasmuch as damages 
and removal costs are comparatively low, the 
solution is primarily determined by the balance 
between prevention expenditures and perpetual 
population maintenance. The monotonically in-
creasing total represents ever-increasing losses 
for populations above three snakes. 
  One is tempted to draw the general conclusion 
from this example that the steady state solution 
will always be  N  and that it should be attained as 
rapidly as possible. This turns out not to be the 
case, however. Figure 4 illustrates the case where 
prevention expenditures become negligibly effec-
tive, relative to killing or sterilizing the existing 
                                                                                    
11 Total losses here are defined as V
N + Z
N and include the cost to 
reduce population from seven to the desired level, the perpetual cost of 
catching the growth at the desired level, the perpetual damages in-
curred from maintaining this level of snakes, and the cost of the pre-
vention/removal cycle Z
*.  
12 Now the total cost is everything mentioned in the above footnote, 
minus Z









































Figure 3. Optimal Population Reduction ( N = 3, N






































Figure 4. Optimal Population Reduction When  N = 28, N
* = 2 
 
population, only after the population reaches 28. 
In this case, the population should be immediately 
decreased from seven to two snakes and main-
tained at that steady state thereafter. As illus-
trated, the steady state occurs where the marginal 
present value costs of population maintenance 
costs (due to higher growth) equal the marginal 
benefits of reduced removal costs plus the re-
duced prevention costs. The result of a small sta-
ble population is robust to our choice of  N . For 
values of  N  greater than 28, N
* remains at 2.
13 
  In summary, the optimal strategy calls for im-
mediate reduction down to a very low population 
                                                                                    
13 The prevention cost curve is low and flat, while the population 
maintenance curve is high and monotonically increasing. 
followed by maintenance at that population, pos-
sibly with continued prevention expenditures. 
  Status quo vs. optimal policy. As in the Mico-
nia case, we now compare the status quo policy 
of spending $76,000 annually on control and $2.6 
million on prevention to the optimal program of 
population reduction from seven to three and 
continued maintenance at three. First we compare 
the cost of both programs. The present value of 
the cost of the status quo policy is $133.8 million 
and only $17.8 million
14 if we were to follow the 
optimal policy. Table 2 below provides details on 
                                                                                    
14 The cost of reduction from seven to three snakes is $573,510, and 
the cost and damages of maintaining the three-snake population is 
$17.2 million. Burnett et al.  Prevention, Eradication, and Containment of Invasive Species: Illustrations from Hawaii   75 
 
 
Table 2. Cost Savings under Optimal Brown Treesnake Policy 
 
First period 
cost  Annual cost  PV costs 
Annual 
damages  PV damages  PV losses 
Status quo  $2.676 m  $2.676 m  $133.8 m  $4.5 b  $138.5 b  $138.6 b 
Optimal program  $573,510  $344,397  $17.79 m  $363  $19,000  $17.81 m 
 
 
benefits of switching to the optimal program. 
  While the status quo policy involves consider-
able spending, the policy does not have a signifi-
cant impact on the growth of the snake population 
because it continues to focus on preventing new 
arrivals, when there may already be a minimum 
viable population in Hawaii.
15 With this level of 
spending, after 20 years the population of snakes 
will have already gone from seven to 709,615 
snakes, and after about 35 years will have already 
reached its status quo steady state, very close to 
the carrying capacity of 38.8 million snakes. 
  This rapidly increasing population associated 
with status quo policy guarantees high levels of 
damage. If we instead spend more money up front 
($573,510 instead of $76,000) to reduce the popu-
lation from seven to three, we are able to spend 
less every year to remain at this level and can 
avoid the high levels of losses promised by 
following the status quo policy. As before, the 
optimal policy costs less in present value terms, 
while preventing over $100 billion in losses as 





Using optimal control theory, we generate neces-
sary conditions for efficient spending on popula-
tion management of an invasive species that has 
already established itself in an environment, and 
prevention and control expenditures for a poten-
tial invader. 
  Current expenditures on Miconia removal are 
not containing expansion. If status quo spending 
is continued, expansion will continue until the 
                                                                                    
15 Close monitoring of the progress of the snake in Saipan (Com-
monwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands) should give a good in-
dication of what is in store for Hawaii; though considerable efforts are 
being expended to forestall additional arrivals, there is agreement that 
an incipient population is in place. Efforts there continue to focus on 
interception rather than removal. 
population is at a much higher level, incurring 
both high damages and wasted control resources 
in the process. By spending more today on Mico-
nia, the population can be contained at a rela-
tively low level of sustained damages and subse-
quent control expenditures. 
  Consideration of our simplifying assumptions 
is suggestive of possible extensions. For example, 
we chose to model the seed bank by assuming 
that the removal of a single tree would require re-
treatment over time, in effect subsuming the re-
moval of future growth from seeds into the cost 
of removing the parent tree. We also subsumed 
spatial considerations into the population growth 
function and the search and removal cost func-
tion. It may be illuminating to model these as-
pects explicitly. For example, it may be desirable 
to consider strategies such as containment of the 
core (dense, original infestations) or satellite (more 
sparse, spread out offspring) populations of Mi-
conia. While spatial elements are implicitly repre-
sented in the search cost function, it would be use-
ful to model these considerations explicitly. 
  In the case of the Brown treesnake, our results 
suggest that maintenance of a very low popula-
tion is the optimal policy choice. If in fact a small 
number of snakes are already present, the mix of 
prevention and control must focus on both inter-
cepting arrivals and catching existing snakes and 
maintaining a low population in perpetuity. At 
low populations, perpetuity damages and first-
period removal costs become relatively unimpor-
tant, and the optimal number of snakes occurs 
where the marginal benefit of population reduc-
tion (due to lower costs of population mainte-
nance) equals the marginal cost due to increased 
prevention expenditures. 
  Modeling simultaneous prevention and control 
in general is intractable due to dependence of op-
timal decisions today on optimal and interdepend-
ent decisions in the future, which depend in turn 
on the realization of stochastic variables. We 
have chosen one way to break through the com-76    April 2006  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
plexity; other methods will be the subject of fu-
ture research. One complication avoided in the 
present paper regards the distinction between 
uncertain arrival and uncertain population estab-
lishment. This in turn suggests needed scientific 
knowledge. In particular, a better understanding 
of the probability of a snake mating and repro-
ducing would enhance our ability to accurately 
determine the probability of establishment sepa-
rate from the probability of entry, rather than the 
combined, average probability of entry and es-
tablishment used here. Sex ratios in arrivals may 
also be considered. The scientific evidence from 
Guam suggests that male-female ratios are not 
one-to-one, with perhaps many fewer females 
than males moving into transport zones (Rodda 
2005). An extended model of the snakes would 
also consider the extent to which future introduc-
tions matter, with their importance decreasing 
with population size. 
  Another important source of uncertainty sur-
rounding the snake results is the current popula-
tion of snakes in Hawaii. While the actual number 
may be as low as zero or as much as 100, we il-
lustrate the model using the subjective mode of 
seven. Because this type of information will likely 
never be understood with complete certainty, it 
would be useful to derive results for a range of 
initial populations. These may help counter the 
political tendency to ignore the possibility that a 
small snake population already exists. 
  A high priority for future research is to explic-
itly model the risk of establishment from both the 
existing population and potential new invaders. 
This line of research is likely to support the quali-
tative conclusion here that a balance between pre-
vention and control is indicated. Clearly, spend-
ing nothing on prevention would result in popula-
tion establishment. But establishment may also 
occur from snakes that are already present, espe-
cially if existing snakes have entered through the 
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